21 April 2026
BALANCING SOVEREIGNTY AND OPENNESS: REGULATING FOREIGN INFLUENCE WITHOUT STIFLING GROWTH
"No man is an island, Entire of itself; Every man is a piece of the continent,
A part of the main."
The European poet who wrote those words 400 years ago has become relevant in today's discussions.
No nation is an isolated island, entire of itself.
Every country faces foreign influence, only differing in how they manage it.
Some countries tend to ban foreign influence operations outright, with severe penalties for those involved. Others take a narrower approach - prohibiting foreign funding in sensitive sectors like arms, security and elections.
There are those, still, who will allow it elsewhere if properly disclosed. Foreign-funded lobbying, for example, is usually legal provided the money trail is transparent.
That is the common-sense line.
Uganda is not starting from scratch in this. We already have the NGO Act (2016) and the Political Parties and Organizations Act (2005), both of which could be sharpened with the passage of time and rapid development of technology.
But do we need entirely new legislation to regulate or prohibit online foreign operations? We think we do.
To stress the central point, foreign influence is not new. Every country has it and exerts it on others. The test is whether we can tell help from harm.
Our history shows foreign influence cuts both ways. Some interventions helped; others harmed. Any new law must weigh both outcomes. The task for us all, and particularly Parliament, is to separate legitimate foreign influence — open and transparent — from covert foreign interference — coercive, deceptive, or clandestine.
What other democracies do:
The principle is the same worldwide: nearly every country now has laws to combat foreign interference in political parties, civil society and online spaces.
The UK leans on three key statutes: the National Security Act 2023, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and the Online Safety Act 2023.
Singapore’s Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, passed in 2021, lets the state direct platforms and individuals to counter hostile information campaigns.
It tags “Politically Significant Persons” for stricter reporting on foreign donations and links.
Canada’s Bill C-70, tabled in 2024, would create a foreign influence transparency registry and toughen penalties for acting on behalf of foreign entities against Canadian interests.
Australia criminalized foreign interference under its Criminal Code, with jail terms of up to 20 years, backed by a Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme.
The United States uses the Foreign Agent Registration Act to compel disclosure by anyone acting for foreign principals. Federal law already bars foreign nationals from funding U.S. campaigns. New proposals aim to close loopholes on “indirect” contributions.
The European Union is pushing transparency rules, tighter ‘revolving door’ limits, and curbs on foreign-funded third-party electioneering.
The common tools across these laws (now also proposed for the Ugandan law) include:
a) Registration: requiring agents of foreign governments to declare the relationship, as Australia does.
b) Funding bans: Prohibiting foreign donations to political candidates and parties, as Singapore and the United States do.
c) Information controls: Empowering authorities to order takedowns of accounts run by foreign actors sowing discord, and targeting proxies. These also criminalize the use of local agents to sway politics or policies in favour of a foreign entity.
So the distinction matters.
A law targeting domestic interference by hostile foreign actors should focus on the financial ecosystem — blocking local proxies from accessing funds for that purpose.
As is usual in legal matters and orderly conduct of society, definitions are the foundation of any discussion.
We must define terms precisely. Foreign funding — grants, aid, loans with no ownership or control — is not the same as foreign direct investment — capital placed in an Ugandan enterprise with ownership, control and long-term commercial interest.
Both serve development, but they need different rules.
Conflating them is to risk creating regulatory gaps, lost tax revenue, distorted investment data and shaken investor confidence. The law should distinguish grants, loans and equity, and spell out how each is regulated in the context of sovereignty.
We face one core task today, as Ugandans: define the enemy (in a manner of speaking).
The task is definitional: Foreign influence — which is open, transparent engagement — is not foreign interference. Foreign interference is often covert, coercive, deceptive action.
For instance, a foreign state or player paying local proxies to spread disinformation or misinformation to influence policy is interference.
The intent of the Sovereignty Bill intent is sound. Its success depends on clarity, restraint and honesty about our own history.
The contributions to the debate are therefore important and welcome. That is why we are processing the Bill through Parliament where the people’s representatives would interface with the law.
The scope of the Bill as we understand it is to regulate agents of foreigners and foreign fund intended to influence Government Policy. All Ugandans should be behind this for Uganda.
The issue is whether a Ugandan or a person who receives money from the diaspora that is intended for private, commercial or family purposes, will be required to comply with the provisions of the Protection of Sovereignty Act, once passed.
The scope of the Act is clearly defined under the Bill and it does not include funds received for private, commercial or family purposes.
The law will only apply to funds that are meant to fund the activities listed in in the Bill - that is activities that are intended to promote the interests of a foreigner against the interests of Ugandans; activities influencing the development of the policy of Uganda's Government; activities influencing the public to oppose the policy of Government; and funding of political parties or organisations or any person contesting for an election in Uganda.
The justification for the Protection of Sovereignty Bill is grounded in the urgent need to safeguard Uganda’s autonomy and stability in the face of many identified challenges.
The Bill is not an isolationist turn, but a measured assertion of Uganda’s right to self-govern and definition of the terms of its engagement with global systems.
The following points outline the rationale for the Bill and why it is timely and necessary:
(a) Filling legal and policy gaps: A technical justification for the Bill is that it will fill gaps in the existing legislative framework. While Uganda has laws touching on these domains (e.g. the NGO Act 2016, Anti-Money Laundering Act, Anti- Terrorism Act, the Public Finance Management Act), these laws operate in silos and do not explicitly articulate the overarching principle of sovereignty protection.
(b) Preserving national security and social stability: Unregulated and unchecked external funding directly impact national security and social cohesion.
(c) Upholding self-determination in policy making: The Bill is further justified by the principle that Uganda’s development path and laws, should be determined by Ugandans, in line with our values and needs. This principle is increasingly important given the instances of external pressure.
(d) Strengthening governance and accountability: A sovereign state must also be accountable to its citizens. By strengthening regulations on NGOs and foreign funding, the Bill actually enhances good governance. It is a move to ensure that all actors on Ugandan soil whether governmental or non-governmental, domestic or foreign-funded abide by the law and operate transparently.
(e) Protecting cultural integrity and social values: Another justification lies in safeguarding Uganda’s cultural sovereignty. Ugandans have the right to uphold their own values, traditions, and social norms without undue foreign dictation. The Bill reinforces the notion that such matters are for Ugandans to decide. This stance is bolstered by international principles of sovereignty. Uganda is a signatory to the 2020 Geneva Consensus Declaration, which affirms national sovereignty in policy decisions on life, family and gender.
The Bill does not prohibit foreign funding or cross-border transfer of money. Instead, the Bill intends to regulate foreign funding in order to safeguard Uganda’s sovereignty.
Once again, Uganda is not the first in enacting this kind of legislation. It is following in the footsteps of other countries - better late than never.
The sovereignty conversation is difficult. But it must be held!
Our children’s future depends on us getting it right - all Ugandans who wish Uganda well.
Any input towards the Protection of Sovereignty Bill is therefore welcome.
Success hinges on clear definitions, targeted tools, and the wisdom to tell the difference between helpful foreign engagement and covert interference.
Security matters. So does growth. The Bill must protect both.
Now let us all get involved and make a law that works for Uganda.
The Author is the Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda
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