The deliberate cultivation of an entrenched harmonious relationship between the civilian population and the military is a relatively new concept in Uganda’s post colonial history. Ugandans of a certain age watch in wonder - UPDF community cleaning exercises, offering free medical services, building civilian facilities and generally working to uplift the wellbeing of Wana-inchi. Until recently, this was not a given. The former Uganda Army [UA] and later on Uganda National Liberation Army [UNLA] were derivatives of Kings African Rifles [KAR]. In 1962, the British colonial government granted Uganda independence and transferred power to a civilian government led by the then-Prime Minister, Dr. Apollo Milton Obote. The military, which was only a battalion strong - originated from the King’s African Rifles who were left to defend and protect Uganda after the British retreated.

The Colonial power had trained the KAR to enforce colonial rule and some elements had fought in the second world war. Allegiance to the new state was not guaranteed. The same applied to the armies in Kenya and Tanganyika. Early in 1964, the KAR in all three newly independent East African countries mutinied, demanding a pay raise and suitable promotions to match their new position. A precedent had been set and it did not auger well for future civil military co-operation in Uganda.

A quick glance at the history of Armed Forces. The notion of a state with sovereignty and territory, marked by a clear boundary, originated from the Conference of Westphalia in 1648. Before this, there were no states but frontiers. When the concept of a state developed, it created a need for a strong authority to defend it from other external powers within the anarchic broad system. Each state had to work to survive by building and funding a strong military and instruments of national power. The military was therefore established to deter external threats, defend, and safeguard the national interests. If you ask yourself, what was a colonial army established to do in Uganda or else where? This was a force established by illegitimate occupiers of our territories to enforce their interests, not ours.

Let’s revisit the story of Uganda’s Armies before 1986. When the post colonial forces in the East African region mutinied around the same time in the early 1960’s, all the three heads of Government in these countries had to request the British government to suppress the mutinies. The British Commandos, still based in Kenya, responded and contained the situation. This was an eye opener. The Army could challenge civilian authority. Indeed, in 1971, the Army led by Gen. Amin Dada, overthrew the government in Uganda. This Coup d’état marked the start of a chaotic period.
Contrast this with the birth of NRA/UPDF. Born and bred in the jungles of Luwero Triangle, the nucleus of the force was sheltered, blended, was fed and recruited from the population near and far- but within Uganda. The notion of a pro-people force, a peoples Army starts with its formation. I observed it first hand as a young school pupil. You would be right to call me a Kadogo because I was involved in NRA’s clandestine recruitment operations. Our home was a rendezvous for scattered soldiers [those who had run away from UNLA] but were hiding in Western Uganda. Major Gen [Rtd} Emmanuel Burundi and my late cousin, the late Major George Rwaibanda led this group. All together, there were about 20 ex UNLA soldiers who had deserted the Army, some with their pistols but had not found a way to the bush yet!

Just like the main group in Luwero, they were hidden, fed and eventually facilitated by the civilians to find their way to the Triangle. I remember a senior combatant who came to fetch them. Stephen Kashaka, now a retired Major General. Their assembly point was our ware-house behind my parent’s business in Kazo. I was the errand boy – buying logistics needed for the group’s journey to Luwero – as they could not go to shops fearing to be identified by UPC functionaries.
The group who travelled by foot that night mid-1981 included people like Emmanuel Burundi, now a retired Major General, the late Captain James Kamuntu, the late Tom Mihirane and others. This is the genesis of the people’s army, the NRA, which started off embedded within the population. It was the NRA/M government which assumed power in 1986 that bought about the current dispensation where we can talk of civil military cooperation [CIMIC] but the relations started way back in Fronasa.

Even at the peak of the insurgencies post 1986, the NRA/UPDF cared about and worked with the populations in those troubled areas. You could well argue that one of the key reasons these groups were defeated was due to UPDF’s good relations with the population. The insurgents were eventually isolated and dealt a blow, militarily.
In the meantime, where the President spotted gaps, and I would argue these were civil/military relations, he sought to close them. For example, in 2001, he appointed Gen Katumba Wamala as the Inspector General of Police [IGP]. This followed serious complaints from the public that Police was unable to curb raising crime in Kampala metropolitan. Subsequent appointments continued to increase the number of Military officers seconded to the Police, URA, Uganda Wild Life Authority, Fisheries and Forestry. The Media and some commentators argued that the government was militarising the Institutions. The counter-argument was that these Institutions lacked certain competencies that require Military support and that the constitution allowed it anyway.
Later, UPDF started working with NAADS, a program focused on poverty reduction and agricultural modernisation, which is vital to Uganda's economic growth. This development presented challenges and opportunities, requiring UPDF personnel to quickly learn and adapt to their new status as agents of socio-economic transformation. Their involvement has been crucial, as they directly support the broader aims of Uganda’s stability and economic transformation. This has already paid dividends.

I have broadened Civil-Military Cooperation in Uganda to refer to the interaction between the military as an institution and the other sectors of society with which the military is involved. It is a complex and multidisciplinary subject that could well be studied as a module in Development studies. While as the most common and observable CIMIC activities include periodic community exercises, free medical services, construction and repairs of civilian facilities around Tarehe-Sita – the more intrinsic ones could be the interaction between UPDF and NAADS and some of the activities of Operation Wealth Creation such as the distribution of seeds and planting materials. Clearly, these interactions constitute what is civil military cooperation as a concept. At the heart of this dichotomy is the principle of civilian control of the Military.

This principle is enshrined in the Constitution of Uganda where the civilian policy makers would establish goals of security policies and provide the material resources for the Military to carry out those policies. Article 208 [2] of the Constitution which subordinates UPDF to civilian authority outlines that. Civil-Military cooperation is healthiest when there is mutual trust between civilians and the military, leading to a respectful give and take. In Uganda’s case, we are yet to test these dynamics out with a civilian commander in chief. President Museveni has been an all-rounder stratifying both civil and military spheres which has been a bonus. We hope for a continuation of CIMIC under a future civilian Commander in Chief. Like former President Obama’s campaign slogan: ‘Our destiny is not written for us, it is written by us, we are the generation we’ve been waiting for and YES WE CAN’.

Dennis Katungi is Head of Communications & Media Relations – Uganda Media Centre
@Dennis_Katungi